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INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I
Office of Internal Oversight Services

Confidential

TO: Major General Guido Palmieri   DATE: 28 September 2004
A: Chief Military Observer
     UNMOGIP HQ Srinagar

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:5 (0777 /04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS   *P. Azarias*

SUBJECT:
OBJET: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/680/01: Field Security Procedures in UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)**

1.   I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted during June 2004.

2.   We note from your response to the draft report that UNMOGIP has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on the comments, the recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendation database pending remedial actions completed. In order for us to close out the recommendations, we request that you provide us with additional information as indicated in the text of the report and a time schedule for implementing each of the recommendations. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status.

3.   IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

4.   I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff of UNMOGIP for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
           Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO
           Ms. Diana Russler, Director and Deputy UN Security Coordinator
           Ms. Diane Kepler, Chief, Internal Audit Section, UNDP
           UN Board of Auditors
           Programme Officer, OIOS
           Nawal Yadav, Chief Resident Auditor, UNMISET

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Internal Audit Division I

Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNMOGIP

Audit no: AP 2004/680/01

Report date: 28 September 2004

Audit team: Nawal Yadav, Auditor-in-Charge

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNMOGIP

OIOS conducted an audit of UNMOGIP security procedures in June 2004.

The United Nations Mission Observers Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has been in operation since 1949 and has its working area in both countries. Its Headquarters office is at Srinagar in India during May-October and Rawalpindi in Pakistan during November-April. It has a Liaison Office at Delhi and five Field Stations in India and seven Field Stations in Pakistan. The host governments of both countries provide army personnel for the security of the Mission's HQs and Field Stations and also drivers for the Mission's vehicles.

The objectives of the audit were to assess the organizational setup for management of security functions, chain of command, security plans, the system of coordination between the Mission and other UN agencies, the Mission's preparedness to meet any emergency, and staff and warden awareness about security arrangements.

The Mission security arrangements are satisfactory. It has a reasonably effective control on access to the UN offices. It has installed blast-resistant film on its windows of HQs Offices at Rawalpindi and Srinagar. The ID control is also effective. The Mission has a Security Operations Centre that works on 24/7 basis.

The Mission has an updated Security Plan approved in June 2004. There exists some confusion, however, about the roles of Head of the Mission and two Designated Officials, one in Pakistan, and the other in India, relating to security matters. Furthermore, the location of the Mission's Headquarters in Srinagar did not provide for adequate physical security. However, plans were underway to find a new location.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

1.   OIOS conducted an audit of UNMOGIP security procedures in June 2004. The objectives of the audit were to assess the organizational setup for management of security functions, chain of command, security plans, the system of coordination between the Mission and other UN agencies, the Mission's preparedness to meet any emergency, and staff and warden awareness about security arrangements. The report incorporates UNMOGIP's comments, which are shown in italics.

2.   The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has been in operation since 1949 to observe cease-fire on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. The Mission has its HQs office at Srinagar during May-October and Rawalpindi during November-April. The Mission has a Liaison Office in Delhi and seven Field Stations on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC) and five on the Indian side. The host governments provide security guards and drivers to HQs, the Liaison Office, and the Field Stations from their respective armies.

3.   The host governments are responsible for security of the UN personnel and property at no cost to the Mission. The Chief Military Observer (CMO) is Head of the Mission who has set up a Mission Security Management Team (MSMT) comprising senior officials. The officials of UNMOGIP also attend Security Management Team (SMT) meetings of India and Pakistan in which all other UN agencies participate.

4.   The Mission has a total strength of 45 Military Observers, 24 international staff, 43 local staff and two General Temporary Assistance (GTA) staff. The Mission did not have a position of Security Officer, but in January 2004, a post of security officer was approved. The Mission is in the process of filling the post. Mr. Ilpo Mikkola, Chief of General Services (CGS), who is also the Focal Point for Security, performs the role of security officer.

5.   The security guards are equipped with weapons and stay in the office compound. The drivers for the Mission vehicles are also from the respective armies of the host government. They also stay in the office compound along with the security guards. The combined strength of drivers and guards is considered adequate to provide security to the office premises and personnel. The host governments increase the number of security personnel if there is some additional threat.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

6.   The objective of the audit was to review structures, systems and controls of the Mission for security of the personnel and physical assets in the light of applicable UN regulations, rules and instructions.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7.   The audit focused on the physical security of personnel and assets in the Mission. The methodology consisted of interviews with senior Mission management and review of documents. Audit fieldwork was conducted at Headquarters offices in Rawalpindi and Srinagar. The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

8.   The Mission's offices are scattered in both countries at locations with varying degrees of security phases from Phase I to Phase III. It had reasonably adequate arrangements for security of personnel and physical assets consistent with the perceived threat and the security phases of the different areas. The Mission has an adequate number of security personnel and drivers from the army of the host governments. It has set up its own Mission Security Management Team (MSMT) and has a functional system of coordination with other UN agencies and the host governments. The Mission has to work in coordination with the Designated Official (DO) India and the DO Pakistan. The Designated Officials' areas of operation are in Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the control of both countries. However, there exists some confusion as to roles of the Chief Military Observer (CMO), the DO India and the DO Pakistan with respect to security matters.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Key Performance Indicators

9.   The Mission has neither a separate Security Section nor a full time security officer. The major cost relating to security matters is borne by the respective host governments. As a result, the Mission does not recognize security as a separate cost center nor does it prepare budget, for security functions on RBB format.

B. Policy, Direction and Guidance

<u>Chain of Command</u>

10.   According to UNSECOORD, the Chief Military Observer (CMO) is responsible for the security of the UNMOGIP personnel only. For the rest of India and Pakistan, the Designated Officials are the heads of UNDP in the respective countries. The UNDP offices in both the countries consider themselves as principal agencies responsible for the security of staff and assets in all UN agencies except UNMOGIP, for which the CMO is responsible. However, the Security Plan of UNMOGIP (dated 10 June 2004) conceives a direct relationship with UNSECOORD for recommending security phase III or above in the area of Jammu and Kashmir. The CMO does not have any reporting relationship with DOs of India or Pakistan.

11.   In UNMOGIP's MSMT meeting dated 17 February 2004, the CMO raised the issue that the UNSECOORD Monthly Advisory is not clear on whether the CMO is responsible for only UNMOGIP personnel or all UN travelers in his/her area of responsibility. The MSMT recommended that this issue be clarified by the UNHQs. The Mission has requested UNHQ to clarify the above matter, but no clarification had been received as of the date of the audit.

Recommendation 1

The Chief Military Observer should request UNSECOORD to clarify the roles of the Chief Military Observer, UNMOGIP, in relation to the Designated Officials of India and Pakistan regarding the reporting relationship on declaration of security phase and security

clearance procedures for travelers to India and Pakistan (AP2004/680/01/01).

12.   *UNMOGIP stated that the previous CMO had made a written agreement with the DO of India, where the roles and responsibilities of each DO were defined. With regard to the DO of Pakistan this had never been considered an issue, as the Pakistan SMT was attended regularly by UNMOGIP personnel. UNSECOORD had been contacted to clarify the roles of the DOs in India, Pakistan and UNMOGIP, but no clarification had been received. The mission will again contact UNSECOORD to provide clear guidance on the matter.* The recommendation will remain open in OIOS' database until the Mission gets clarification from UNSECOORD regarding the roles and responsibilities of the DOs.

Security Policy

13.   The Mission issued its Security Policy on 12 June 2004. The Security Policy mainly deals with security arrangements, relationship with the security management team and the training of the staff relating to security.

Organization Chart

14.   UNMOGIP has an organization chart approved by CMO that shows the line of reporting to CMO by Security Officer, Field Security Officer including warden, Medical Assistant and Chief Transport Officer. The position of Security Officer was created in January 2004 but was vacant at the time of the audit. Currently, the CGS and OIC Personnel perform the roles of security officer and alternate security officer respectively.

Reports to UNSECOORD and DPKO

15.   The CMO periodically reports to USG/DPKO on operational matters. The Mission does not submit any reports on security matters to UNSECOORD. Periodically, the DO India and DO Pakistan report to UNSECOORD on security matters, and their reporting includes the area of UNMOGIP.

C. Security Plan

16.   The Mission has a security plan, which matches with the security phase of the Mission. Its contents conform to Annex B of the Field Security Handbook. It was last updated on 10 June 2004.

17.   Paragraph 1.3 of DPKO Mission Security Management Standard Operating Procedures (September 26 2003) (DPKO-SOP) states "... Dependents of military personnel are not covered by the United Nations security management system, because they have no official status with the organization". However, we noticed that the following provisions of UNMOGIP Security Plan dated 10 June 2004 include dependents of the military observers as authorized dependents:

        a)   The UNMOGIP Security Plan, under the heading of "Integration of UNMOGIP Dependents", states: "Only the dependents of international staff members and military observers and if possible their visitors are coordinated with UN Agencies security plan."

b)   The UNMOGIP Security Plan, under the heading "Regrouping within the Country/area", states: "Dependents are sometimes permitted to reside at certain Field Stations depending on the security situation and the decision of CMO. Those dependents at Field Stations will be relocated to Rawalpindi, Islamabad or New Delhi or to another safer UNMOGIP location."

The above provisions of the Security Plan contradict the SOP issued by DPKO.

Recommendation 2

> UNMOGIP Chief Military Observer and the Designated Official should modify its Security Plan, to the extent it deals with the dependents of military observers, to conform to the Standard Operating Procedure issued by DPKO (AP2004/680/01/02).

18.   *UNMOGIP stated that the plan will be modified, but the mission will continue to include on a voluntary basis, the dependents of Military Observers in evacuation exercises, to ensure that all personnel are familiar with evacuation procedures. There may be an occasion when the security situation deteriorated rapidly and the only course of action is for UN to facilitate evacuation on a reimbursable basis.* The recommendation will remain open in OIOS' database until the Security Plan is modified.

Compliance with Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS)

19.   The Mission's compliance with MOSS was reviewed by UNDP in October 2002. The report showed that the Mission was compliant with most of the requirements. The Threat Assessment report dated 10 June 2004 states that further improvement have been made and currently the Mission is in full compliance with MOSS.

Threat Analysis

20.   The Security Assessment of UNMOGIP was initiated by DPKO in 2002. The members of the Assessment Team were from UNSECOORD and comprised of the Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO), Pakistan, and the FSCO India, Bangladesh and Bhutan. They recommended various actions to be taken in order to improve security. The Mission executed many of the suggested measures. For example, as suggested in the report that the Mission increases the height of the front wall by one meter, install flood lighting facing up and down the busy road, and fix blast-resistant film for the windows of Srinagar HQs. Accordingly, the Mission increased the height of walls, fixed extra lights on the front and rear and installed blast-resistant film on windows of the HQs office at Srinagar.

21.   The Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO) conducts and frequently updates a detailed Threat Assessment. The latest Threat Assessment dated 10 June 2004 states that no direct threat exists at present against UNMOGIP. The report further states that "Although lots of effort has been put into improving the security at Srinagar HQs, the building is an old wooden one and positioned at a very vulnerable point. In front of the building you find a road from where explosives can be tossed into the HQs and firing at the building can take place directly. On backside of the building there is a hill from where the compound is very vulnerable to direct firing and attack with hand

grenade or explosive devices." UNMOGIP is currently pursuing Indian authorities to provide another suitable building for Srinagar HQs office.

22.   During our visit to Srinagar HQs we noticed that backside fencing consisted of barbed wire, which required repairs, if not replacement by a wall. The compound wall has gabion net fencing and the office compound is directly visible from the nearest building. During discussions with the Deputy Chief Military Officer, he also explained that the current location is not suitable as HF and VHF communication experiences congestion quite often.

Recommendation 3

UNMOGIP CMO and the DO, India, should, in coordination with the Indian Authorities, identify an appropriate place for relocation of Srinagar HQs with improved fencing and a more efficient radio communication system (AP2004/680/01/03).

23.   *UNMOGIP stated that the Indian authorities have been requested to provide an alternative HQ in Srinagar. At the time of writing there has been no response.* The recommendation will remain open in OIOS database pending its implementation.

Warden System

24.   The Mission has four wardens and five alternate wardens for the international staff. It has six wardens and six alternate wardens for the local staff. We issued a survey questionnaire to ten of them in order to assess the extent of their compliance with the Mission's security plan. We received nine responses. We found that all of them had communication equipment and all of them knew how to use it. The wardens periodically visited the staff residences and were in close contact with the staff under their responsibility.

Lists of UN Personnel

25.   The Mission database has complete records of all personnel checking in and checking out. The Mission had hard copies of these lists available as well.

D.   Security Procedures

26.   The host government provides the security guards for UNMOGIP HQs and Field Stations. There is no document stating the job description, roles and responsibilities and chain of command of the security personnel. Further, the number of persons normally deployed for the security of UNMOGIP is also not mentioned in any document. It is the discretion of the host government to assign any number of persons.

27.   The host government does not provide a list of the army personnel assigned for UNMOGIP security. The guards follow command of the host government's army and UNMOGIP coordinates with the Army Liaison Officer in case of need. During our visit, we interviewed the chief of the guard platoon. We learned that there were in all 23 army personnel for HQs office Rawalpindi and

another six were expected by the following week. Similarly, there were 20 Central Reserve Police Force personnel for the HQ office at Srinagar and 25 persons relating to the Transport Unit.

28.   The Mission does not issue UNMOGIP identity cards to army personnel assigned for the security of UNMOGIP premises. The army ID is considered as permission to enter the UNMOGIP compound.

Access Control

29.   We observed that access to the premises at Rawalpindi and Srinagar is well protected. The main gate of entry at HQs office Rawalpindi has an X-ray machine and a metal detector. All visitors are required to pass through it. Visitors are allowed to enter the office premises only after a staff escort comes to escort the visitor from the gate. A log of visitors is maintained and the visitor's ID is held until their departure from the premises. Non-UN vehicles are not allowed to enter the premises unless specially approved. All vehicles including UN vehicles are examined by mirror before being allowed entry.

30.   We observed that the main gate of entry at the HQ office at Srinagar has a metal detector and all visitors are checked before allowing entry. The visitors are allowed to enter the office premises only after the concerned official signs them in the log and the visitor has either a staff or security guard escort. The log of the visitors is maintained but we noticed that the visitor's ID is not recorded in the log. It was explained there were very few visitors who were not well known to the staff.

ID Cards Inventory Control

31.   The Security SOP for UNMOGIP does not mention the procedure for issuing Identity cards (IDs) and the procedure to control unauthorized access to UNMOGIP office premises. The Personnel Section issues ID cards. The blank IDs are kept in a locked cupboard and the OIC Personnel has the key. No record is maintained for blank IDs received and used. The OIC Personnel explained that this was a small Mission and only a limited number of cards was used each year. The blank cards are kept safely although no record for the movement of cards is maintained.

E. Security Coordination

Coordination with Other UN Agencies and Host Government

32.   There is a Mission Security Management Team (MSMT). Apart from this, the Chief Administrative Officer attends on behalf of CMO in SMT of Pakistan where other UN agencies also participate. Similarly, the Staff Officer in charge of UNMOGIP Liaison Office Delhi represents the CMO at SMT for India. There is also satisfactory coordination with the host governments.

Crisis Management Plan

33.   The Mission has a Crisis Management and Security Contingency Plan, which was updated on 12 June 2004. It basically includes the procedure for relocation/evacuation of UNMOGIP

civilian staff and military staff and their dependents to safe-haven areas/countries in the event of deterioration of the security situation in the host countries. However, it does not include procedures for crisis due to other emergency situations such as earthquake, fire, etc.

Recommendation 4

The UNMOGIP CMO should review its Crisis Management Plan to include procedures for other emergencies such as those arising out of an earthquake, fire, etc. (AP2004/682/01/04).

34.   *UNMOGIP stated that the crisis plan for the Mission will be adapted to include other emergencies such as earthquake, fire, etc.* The recommendation will remain open in OIOS' database until Crisis Management Plan is revised as above.

F. Communication with Staff

Staff Awareness

35.   We issued a questionnaire consisting of 17 questions to 19 staff members selected randomly to assess their preparedness for meeting any emergency. Sixteen replied. Generally, we found that they were abreast of the security information, had communication equipment and were satisfied with the warden system. The Mission did not have a formal induction training program for new arrivals as there were a few new arrivals each year who were briefed personally during check-in by the various sections.

Communication Equipment

36.   The Mission has a written policy for distributing communication equipment among staff members. The Mission has distributed VHF hand-held radios to all UNMOs, International staff and wardens. Similarly, cell phones are also distributed to section chiefs and other personnel based on justification.

Security Operations Centre

37.   The Mission has set up a Security Operation Centre at both the HQ offices. It is equipped with computers, VHF radios, fax and telephones. This center is operational 24/7 by staffing Duty Officers (Military Observers) on rotational basis. The Center remains in touch with field stations and any urgent matters are brought to the notice of the CMO. We noticed that the CCTV monitors were installed at HQs offices at Rawalpindi and Srinagar in April 2004 but both were out of order. We were informed that they were under repair.

G. Security Education

Training of Security Staff

38.   The Focal Point of Security (CGS) and Military Training and Security Officer (a military observer) had received training at Brindisi organized by DPKO/UNSECOORD relating to security in 2002 and 2003. The host governments provide security to the Mission, so the Mission does not have to conduct any such training.

Training in Security by the Mission

39.   The Mission does not have a formalized education program on security. Instead, it delivers security-related training. The Military Training and Security Officers are responsible for training Military Observers and for briefing international and national staff.

UNSECOORD Training Course: Basic Security In Field

40.   The Secretary General, through his Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/19 dated 9 December 2003 promulgated that "All staff working in or traveling to a duty station where a security phase is in effect will be required to complete the learning programme by 15 January 2004. All other staff members must complete the learning programme as soon as possible and no later than 31 March 2004." We found that all international and local staffs have completed the training and their certificates were available for verification.

Awareness about MOSS

41.   The Mission had its Mission Security Management Team, of which all section chiefs are members. The MSMT discussed the status of MOSS compliance.

Training Security and Stress Management for Senior Officials

42.   Paragraph 28 of General Assembly document, "Inter-organizational security measures (A/57/365)" requires that senior security managers should attend training programs in security and stress management provided by UNSECOORD. Paragraph 29 ibid requires that security and stress management training is mandatory for all Designated Officials and Members of Security Management Teams. We learned that no such training had been organized at UNMOGIP. The focal point for training of UNMOGIP was in touch with the UNSECOORD Stress Management Unit and was planning to arrange a joint training program coordinating with UNAMA, which was expected to organize training when the security officer of the Mission would be on board.

> **Recommendation 5**
>
> The UNMOGIP CMO should request UNSECOORD to organize the mandatory training in security and stress management for Head of the Mission, Members of SMT and security staff (AP2004/680/01/05).

43. *UNMOGIP stated that UNSECOORD will be requested to provide the mandatory training in security and stress management for mission members of the SMT.* The recommendation will remain open in OIOS database until the above training is organized.

H. Security Section of the Mission

<u>Work Plan of Security Section</u>

44. The Mission does not have a separate security section as the host governments provide security to the Mission.

<u>Staffing of the Security Section</u>

45. A review of the e-PAS of the Focal Point for Security showed that the goals mentioned in the respective e-PAS matched the security functions.

46. We also noted that UNMOGIP Security Assessment Mission Report conducted by UNSECOORD dated 12 December 2002 had recommended, "UNMOGIP employ a full time security professional for at least 12 months to review all security plans, facilities and procedures in UNMOGIP". As a result, the Mission now has a position of security officer and recruitment is under way.

<u>Ability to Communicate with Local Population</u>

47. Since the security guards are from the army of the respective host governments there is no language problem to communicate with the local population.

I. Security Equipment

48. The Mission generally felt satisfied with the security equipment that it had. There were no pending requests with DPKO for approval of resources to get more equipment.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

49. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors by the officers and staff of the Mission.

Patricia Azarias, Director
Internal Audit Division I, OIOS