

# CONVOY SOP

## For

### USAESCH (Iraq) Contractor Convoy SOP

#### Revised December 9, 2006

#### Summary:

The following convoy Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) will be used as a guideline and basis for more specific procedures that are applicable to the unique situations at each USAESCH (IRAQ) operating location. USAESCH (IRAQ) contractors may implement more stringent standards, but may not adopt less stringent procedures than those specified in this SOP unless approved or changes are made by the Multi National Corps – Iraq.

#### General:

The following are general procedures that will be incorporated into site specific convoy SOPs.

- ✓ **The USAESCH (Iraq) Convoy Approval** form (Annex A) will be sent to USACE HNC Program Manager or his Security Manager/designated rep at least **24 hours prior** to convoy departure for normal convoy operations. This should include the **MNF or GTR form** (Annex A) that is also sent to AEGIS. There is a **48 hour requirement** for convoys traveling through the **MNF (WEST)**.
- ✓ All personnel participating in a convoy operation will receive a convoy security briefing prior to departure, with no exceptions.
- ✓ All security personnel must be SJA certified
- ✓ A minimum of **three security vehicles** will form a convoy with the security vehicles being the lead and trail vehicles in the convoy.
- ✓ Vary convoy routes and departure / arrival times whenever possible.
- ✓ Each vehicle will have a minimum of two personnel.
- ✓ If more than three security vehicles are available, then the other security vehicles will be interspersed within the convoy.
- ✓ The security personnel in non-security vehicles will be seated shotgun and/or behind the driver. Security should drive whenever possible.
- ✓ Unless absolutely essential, convoys will not travel during the hours of darkness.
- ✓ When traveling on multi-lane roads utilize the middle lane or stay as close to the middle of the road as possible. This will provide optimum standoff from an improvised explosive device (IED) placed in the median or on the side of the road.
- ✓ Drive safely, but aggressively. Do not sightsee.
- ✓ The convoy will proceed at a safe speed to its destination. The speed of the convoy will only be as fast as the slowest vehicle and as safe as road conditions allow. **The Maximum vehicle speed for all vehicles is 50 MPH/80 KPH within the Iraq AOR.** The following exceptions to exceed this maximum speed limit follow:
  - ✓ a. **When in enemy contact**
  - ✓ b. **When transporting an urgent litter patient**

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- ✓ Do not stop convoy vehicles prior to reaching the destination unless absolutely necessary and or as covered by SJA requirements, FRAGO 05-231, SOW, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).
- ✓ In open areas, maintain 100 meters between convoy vehicles.
- ✓ In more densely populated areas, vehicles will maintain approximately one car length distance to keep the vehicles from becoming separated.
- ✓ While the convoy is moving in open areas, the vehicle doors should be unlocked. In more densely populated areas, the vehicle doors will be locked to prevent unauthorized access.
- ✓ The ROC will be contacted prior to departure and transponders must be working prior to departure.
- ✓ When the convoy is turning, the trail vehicle will inform the lead vehicle when the turn is complete (e.g., "right turn complete").
- ✓ Security vehicles are prepared to stop traffic (either in front or near the rear of the convoy) in order for the other vehicles to go through intersections. Vehicles assume original convoy positions as soon as possible after the change.
- ✓ When traveling under bridges/overpasses, convoy vehicles should quickly - but safely - change lanes and vary speeds, to avoid grenades and other objects that may be thrown or dropped from the overpass. Security vehicle occupants should keep eyes and weapons trained on the overpass for as long as possible.
- ✓ Convoy vehicles should avoid all obstacles and never intentionally run over anything in the roads.
- ✓ All vehicle occupants should stay alert for anything out of the ordinary. Refrain from lengthy discussions or listening to the radio. The survival of the convoy depends on all personnel being alert and reporting suspicious activities.
- ✓ All personnel will wear their Kevlar helmets, safety glasses and body armor during convoy operations.
- ✓ **Drivers and all passengers shall wear seatbelts.**
- ✓ For friendly identification at night, the convoy vehicles will have a one-inch square of Glint tape located on the roof, front, rear and doors of the vehicle. An authorized substitute is a forward "V" (<) on the doors of the vehicle composed of Glint tape for day or night identification. During daylight hours, a VS-17 panel will be displayed on the dashboard of each convoy vehicle.
- ✓ When convoy security personnel encounter a military or friendly element, weapons will be lowered until they pass. If approached by Coalition Forces, **at no time will contractors point their weapons at those personnel,** or turn around and attempt to flee checkpoints.
- ✓ Security personnel weapons will be locked and loaded upon leaving secured areas, and subsequently cleared at appropriate locations before re-entering friendly installations.
- ✓ During emergency stops, non-security personnel will make necessary repairs to vehicles such as changing tires. Consideration should be given to repositioning a spare tire in the rear of the vehicle.
- ✓ Vehicle headlights will be off (unless operated during the hours of darkness), and turn signals will not be used except to indicate which side of the road has a suspected hazard.
- ✓ Four-way emergency flashers will only be used to indicate a vehicle emergency.

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- ✓ **WARNING SHOTS:** are not authorized Iraq RUF will be followed; Security personnel must believe hostile intent and imminent threat of loss of life or bodily harm is present follow the RUF at all times.
- ✓ **TARGET IDENTIFICATION:** suppressive fire should not be used but identify threat targets and engage
- ✓ **Any shootings will be reported in an SIR format immediately**
- ✓ **Any accidents will be reported to the CMC Security Manger**  
Personnel involved will be assisted (First aid given) and information exchanged military QRF will be contacted at the first possible opportunity and the ROC will be notified immediately. The only time this will not be followed is if the accident involves AIF activity and the Convoy commander determines the threat for lives of the principles is too great. Location, description of vehicle, and the incident will still be reported to the first military patrol or CP on route and the rest of the reporting procedures will be followed.

The only way to ensure a vehicle is 100% free of explosive hazards is to X-ray the vehicle or check the vehicle with an explosive detection dog. Since the X-ray technology is not available and impractical and we have no explosive detection dogs in country (yet), the on-site Security Manager will make the decision to burn or not to burn a vehicle. Caveat: **“DON’T BURN VEHICLES VISCERALLY.”** Recovering a down vehicle is of the utmost importance and it is the last resort (lives in danger) to burn and/or abandon any vehicle.

**Special Convoys:** Notes on Class V Convoys: Class V Convoy teams will develop and have an approved Class V SOP. During a convoy in this classification there will be Class V explosives stored on one or more vehicles in the convoy. In the event the vehicle or vehicles are disabled by a complex attack (SAF, IED Etc.) the security team leader and/or designated security personnel will return to the vehicle or vehicles and as a last resort destroy the class V shipment (this is a last resort). The additional security vehicles will use a floating rally point from the attack point and follow the standard security procedures.

**Southern Theater Convoys:** Any convoys in the British/Danish sector of operations will comply with the designated ROE for this area. All vehicles will travel windows up weapons inside (low threat posture). Any vehicle that has armor packages installed will operate with the full installation, this includes the windows. **SEE ANNEX F**

### **Convoy Briefing:**

The following items will be covered during convoy briefings:

1. **Convoy speed: Maximum convoy speed for all vehicles is 50MPH/80KPH within the Iraqi AO The exceptions to exceed this maximum speed limit are when in enemy contact and when transporting an urgent litter patient.**
  - a. **Each vehicle Commander will verbally confirm the maximum speed.**

### **2.SITUATION**

- a. Enemy
  - (1) Weather
  - (2) Terrain
- b. Friendly

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- (1) Higher
- (2) Adjacent
- (3) Supporting

### 3 MISSION

#### a. Destination

- (1) Distance
- (2) Route and condition (red, amber, green)
- (3) Danger areas
- (4) Checkpoints
- (5) **Rally points (Floating)**

### 4. EXECUTION

#### a. Vehicle and personnel readiness

- (1) Organization and order of March (convoy formation layout)
- (2) Rules of Engagement
- (3) Fire Support Plan
- (4) Routes (PACE)
- (5) Personnel assignments and responsibilities
- (6) Communications check
- (7) Tactics briefing
  - (a) Start Point (SP) / Release Point (RP)
  - (b) Checkpoints
  - (c) **Rally points (Floating)**
  - (d) Route marking
  - (e) Rate of movement
  - (f) Distance between vehicles
  - (g) Vehicle light setting for night movement
  - (h) Timeline
  - (i) Actions at destination
  - (j) Halt procedures
  - (k) Anticipated choke points
  - (l) Identify Threat Targets

#### b. Action on enemy contact

- (1) Ambush
- (2) Engagement
- (3) Explosive attack
- (4) Indirect fire (artillery / mortar attack)
- (5) Dead driver scenario
- (6) Suspected improvised explosive devices

#### c. Contingencies

- (1) Vehicle breakdowns and recovery
- (2) Vehicle accidents
- (3) Lost vehicles
- (4) Obstacles and obstructions

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### 5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Headcount accountability procedures
- b. Fuel consumption rates (by vehicle type) / refueling procedures
- c. Maintenance / servicing / recovery of vehicles
- d. Casualty / medical handling procedures
- e. Safety

### 6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Thuraya, other satellite and cell phones
  - (1) Preprogrammed emergency numbers
- b. Radios
  - (1) Frequencies
  - (2) Call signs
  - (3) Batteries
- c. Signals
  - (1) Day: visual / hand and arm signals
  - (2) Night: I.R / Chem-Lites / strobes
- d. Command and control
  - (1) Chain of command
  - (2) Succession of command
  - (3) Location of key personnel
  - (4) All Convoy Commanders will record every convoy in a log book

### **Contingency Plan:**

A contingency plan, consisting of five points, will be given to the senior site representative not traveling in the convoy prior to the convoy's departure. This will aid in maintaining accountability and executing recovery operations should the convoy fail to arrive at its destination or fail to return to the site at the proper time. As soon as the convoy arrives at its destination, the convoy commander will call site personnel and notify them of arrival time. Prior to returning to home station, the convoy commander will call site personnel and inform them of the intended time of departure, estimated time of arrival at destination, alternate route (if used), and accurate accountability of personnel and equipment. If the convoy is unable to depart at the prescribed time, the convoy commander will call site personnel and inform them of the delay. The contingency plan will, as a minimum, consist of the following:

- Where the convoy is going and estimated time of arrival.
- A manifest of all personnel by name, and the number of vehicles in the convoy.
- The length of time the convoy will be gone and the estimated time of return.
- What actions the site should take if the convoy does not return by the stated time, and what actions the convoy will take if it cannot return by the stated time.
- Time hack and back brief.

Annexes:

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- A. Convoy Approvals
- B. Convoy Training for Immediate Action Drills (IAD)
- C. Vehicle Checklist
- D. Personnel Checklist
- E. Employment of M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) in Convoy Operations
- F. Administrative Convoy Plan
- G. MND SE ROE
- H. LOD on additional instructions for 2 vehicle convoys.

# COALITION MUNITION CLEARANCE

**Annex A: CONVOY APPROVAL**

**CONVOY REQUEST.** Advanced authorization for all convoy movements, to include administrative convoys must be obtained from the USACE USAESCH (IRAQ) cell, Camp Victory. All convoy requests for the MNF West AOR must be submitted for approval 48 hours in advance. All other convoy requests must be submitted and approved 24 hours in advance. Security managers will go through the Camp victory Operations Cell and then to the approval authority below.

Work Convoys for those teams who reside at a FOB and drive to the work site on a daily basis will be submitted for the entire work week. Pen and ink changes are authorized at the local level for personnel changes throughout the week.

Convoy approval for the USAESCH (IRAQ) cell Camp Victory is the Security/Safety Manager in that order.

All approved convoy request will be forwarded to the following e-mail addresses in the by the convoy approval authority.

[shaun.harris1@us.army.mil](mailto:shaun.harris1@us.army.mil)

Once Convoys are approved a copy goes in the first and last vehicle of every convoy.

**Attachments:**

Convoy Approval Form

MNF Form

GTR Form

Requesting Site/Team	
Requesting Person	
Title	

ROC Emergency No

Thuraya:

Thuraya AGI OPS

Location Specific Number

+8821621157354  
(Baghdad)

+8821621157325





Callsign	Vehicle	Special Orders	Item picked up/Dropped Off	Item picked up/Dropped Off	Item picked up/Dropped Off
V1	F350				
V2	F350				
V3	F350				
Remarks					

Signature Block for Final Approval	
Approving Officer Name/Title	Date:
Signature :	



<b>We have TOW and GO capability</b>	<b>*YES</b>	<b>NO</b> (delete as applicable)
<b>We have self recovery capability</b>	<b>*YES</b>	<b>NO</b> (delete as applicable)

**E MAIL TO: [roc.ops@aegisiraq.com](mailto:roc.ops@aegisiraq.com)**  
**(ROC will then encrypt and send to relevant RROC's)**

**ALL MOVEMENTS TO AL ANBAR PROVINCE REQUIRE 48HRS NOTICE**

IF APPROVAL IS NOT GRANTED AND YOU CONTINUE WITH YOUR MISSION,  
 THE CONVOY IS AT RISK OF BEING TURNED AROUND BY

2 MEF, AND ANY REQUEST FOR QRF ASSISTANCE WILL BE DENIED.

FILL IN AS THOROUGHLY AS POSSIBLE. LACK OF DETAILS MAY RESULT IN  
 MNF BEING REJECTED BY 2MEF LMCC

**PSC WILL BE ADVISED BY ROC IF ROUTE CLEARANCE OR MISSION HAS BEEN DENIED**

Mission#:

<b>A</b>	<b>Security Unit</b>	
<b>B</b>	<b>Departure Location</b>	
<b>B1</b>	<b>Departure GRID</b>	
<b>B2</b>	<b>Estimated Departure Date Time Group</b>	
<b>C</b>	<b>Destination Location #1</b>	
<b>C1</b>	<b>Destination GRID #1</b>	
<b>C2</b>	<b>Estimated Departure Date Time Group</b>	
<b>D</b>	<b>Destination Location #2</b>	
<b>D1</b>	<b>Destination GRID #2</b>	
<b>D2</b>	<b>Estimated Departure Date Time Group</b>	
<b>E</b>	<b>Destination Location #3</b>	
<b>E1</b>	<b>Destination GRID #3</b>	
<b>E2</b>	<b>Estimated Departure Date Time Group</b>	
<b>F</b>	<b>Return Location</b>	
<b>F1</b>	<b>Return GRID</b>	
<b>F2</b>	<b>Estimated Arrival Date Time</b>	

	<b>Group</b>	
<b>G</b>	<b>Security Convoy Commander</b>	
<b>H</b>	<b>Security Commander Phone</b>	
<b>I</b>	<b>Proposed Route (MSR – ASR)</b>	
<b>J</b>	<b>Number of Personnel in Convoy Outbound</b>	
<b>J1</b>	<b>Vehicle Count Outbound Security</b>	
<b>J2</b>	<b>Vehicle Count Outbound Cargo</b>	
<b>K</b>	<b>Number of Personnel in Convoy Inbound</b>	
<b>K1</b>	<b>Vehicle Count Inbound Security</b>	
<b>K2</b>	<b>Vehicle Count Inbound Cargo</b>	
<b>L</b>	<b>Cargo Description</b>	
<b>M</b>	<b>Satellite Transponders (Make and Antenna Number.</b>	
<b>Special Instructions:</b>		
<b>REMARKS:</b>		

**NOTE: Convoy movement with multiple destination locations or extended travel days that exceed the information spaces provide above will provide the required information (Departure Location, Departure GRID and Estimated DTG in the remarks section of this form)**

**\*\*\*The requesting agency is responsible for the accuracy of the information provided on the GTR to the PCO LMCC. Mission concept changes must be routed through the LMCC for notification and submission for approval from the military MCB's.**

**E MAIL TO: [roc.ops@aegisiraq.com](mailto:roc.ops@aegisiraq.com) (ROC will then encrypt and send to relevant RROC's)**

**ALL MOVEMENTS TO AL ANBAR PROVINCE REQUIRE 48HRS NOTICE**

## **Annex B: CONVOY TRAINING FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS (IAD)**

Convoy driver's training should be conducted for all USAESCH (IRAQ) contractor personnel. At any given time, any contractor may be required to drive one of the vehicles in a convoy. All personnel, but in particular vehicle drivers, must be able to identify a threat and react instantaneously to any situation that endangers the lives of fellow passengers. Inaction, or "freezing," can be prevented by repetitive training to build muscle memory when conducting IADs. When a potentially hazardous situation arises, the convoy commander will take charge and issue orders as to which IADs to initiate. These directives will be followed without question. As a general rule, convoy members should stay off the radio unless their particular vehicle is attacked or disabled. However, all vehicle occupants should be looking for potentially dangerous situations or suspicious individuals, and pass this information to security personnel in the vehicle in the event that they have not detected the threat. The following are a list of IADs that all personnel should be familiar with and rehearse as often as possible.

1. React to Contact:
  - a. All security personnel identify the threat using the 3 D's (Description, Direction, and Distance).
  - b. This is echoed inside the vehicle by all security personnel and transmitted once over the internal communications to all other vehicles.
  
2. Break Contact. Contact is made and all vehicles are capable of being driven out of the kill zone.
  - a. The number one priority is to extract all U.S. personnel from the kill zone.
  - b. All non-shooters will seek whatever cover they can within the vehicle and make lanes for shooters to utilize.
  - c. All drivers will drive their vehicles away from the threat in the most expeditious manner possible.
  - d. All shooters will seek to return fire with well aimed shots at enemy personnel only.
  - e. No personnel will stop and attempt to engage the enemy in a firefight.
  
3. Break Contact. Contact is made and one or more vehicles cannot be driven out of the kill zone.
  - a. All vehicles and security personnel will establish a security perimeter.
  - b. Security will be the first priority. If security cannot be established near the vehicles, security personnel will move all personnel to the nearest defensible position.
  - c. The next priority will be extracting personnel from the disabled vehicle to functional vehicles and remove them from the enemy line of fire. If

possible, a security position will be established that can lay down an accurate, well-aimed base of fire to suppress the enemy. At this point a recovery vehicle will hastily pick up the personnel from the disabled vehicle(s). This will be done as quickly as possible.

4. Lost vehicle procedures after an attack. Trailing vehicles become separated from lead vehicles during enemy contact.
  - a. Every effort will be made to maintain radio communications until contact is re-established.
  - b. If radio communications are maintained, directions from the convoy commander will dictate actions until vehicle contact can be re-established.
  - c. .If unable to make radio contact with separated vehicle(s), the lead vehicles will assume that the missing vehicle(s) are unable to move or talk and are stuck in the kill zone at the point of contact. **All convoy vehicles will then return together to the point of contact and render assistance.**
  - d. If contact is still not restored, the next pre-established rendezvous point (RP) in the route will become active.
  
5. Lost vehicle procedures with no enemy contact. Trailing vehicles become separated from lead vehicles with no enemy contact.
  - a. Every effort will be made to maintain radio communications until contact is re-established.
  - b. If radio contact is made between separated vehicles, directions from the convoy commander will dictate actions.
  - c. If radio contact is not re-established between separated vehicles, the lead vehicles will continue to move slowly along the planned route toward the RP. The missing vehicles will rapidly continue along the route as planned to the RP.
  - d. If contact is not restored by the time one of the elements reaches the RP, the RP will become activated and Actions at an Activated RP will be followed.
  
6. Actions at an Activated RP. Enemy contact may or may not have been made. There has been a break in contact and an RP has been activated.
  - a. All elements will try to establish radio communications between separated vehicles and notify home station of the situation.
  - b. All elements will move to the active RP. The first element to the RP will establish a security perimeter and start a countdown from 30 minutes.
  - c. All elements will wait at the RP for 30 minutes. If contact is not re-established, the mission will be aborted and the element at the RP will move to the nearest friendly location and await further instructions.

7. Dead driver drill. Following enemy contact, a vehicle driver is dead or incapacitated, but the vehicle is still functional.

- a. The front seat passenger will become the driver.
- b. Personnel in the rear seats will attempt to move the incapacitated driver out of the way, either to the rear seats or to the front passenger door side.
- c. The vehicle will be driven away from the threat to a safe area before a halt is called. If the situation allows during the movement to a safe area, First Aid will be performed on the incapacitated driver.

8. Disabled vehicle cross load procedures. Following enemy contact, a vehicle is too damaged to continue. A threat still exists, but the convoy is not taking fire, and must relocate.

- a. All wounded personnel will be loaded on the nearest appropriate vehicle.
- b. All remaining personnel will be loaded on other available vehicles.
- c. All sensitive items will be removed from the damaged vehicle.
- d. All non-recoverable equipment will be left and the vehicle will be destroyed using one thermite grenade, if available. However, no time will be lost in an attempt to set the vehicle on fire.
- e. In the event that there is inadequate room in convoy vehicles, Iraqi civilian vehicles will be commandeered. Every effort will be made to retain the driver (flex cuffed and gagged) with the vehicle so that the vehicle may be easily returned. The driver should also be paid for the use of his vehicle.

9. An IED is encountered during recovery from an ambush.

- a. Either during the course of a scheduled rest stop, or during recovery operations following an ambush, an IED is encountered.
- b. The first step upon discovery of an IED is to clear the immediate area of all friendly personnel.
- c. With the armed assets available, the area should be cordoned off and secured as much as possible.
- d. Using armed security personnel only, the area should be controlled.
- e. Concurrent with the steps above, notification should be made to the Area Battle Captain, and military explosive ordnance disposal personnel should be requested.
- f. **NO ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE BY CONVOY PERSONNEL TO NEUTRALIZE THE IED.** Only in extreme emergencies - and only if absolutely necessary - should experienced UXO contractor personnel in the convoy attempt to render safe the device.

## **Annex C: VEHICLE CHECKLIST**

Prior to convoy departure, the following items will be checked. This will cover accountability and serviceability of all equipment accompanying the convoy prior to departure from site and prior to return to site. Vehicle pre-operational checks, vehicle inventory to ensure all essential items are present and communications checks (PACE - primary, alternate, contingency and emergency). The inspections will, as a minimum, consist of the following:

1. Vehicle Inspection:
  - ❖ Full tank of fuel (diesel or MOGAS)
  - ❖ Five good tires
  - ❖ All fluids are full (oil, wiper, transmission, coolant)
  - ❖ Vehicle temperature is good
  - ❖ Armor in place (if applicable)
  - ❖ Appropriate Glint tape marking(s)
  
2. Vehicle Packing List:
  - ❖ Extra batteries
  - ❖ Extra ammunition
  - ❖ Smoke grenades (if available)
  - ❖ Thermite grenades (if available)
  - ❖ Maps
  - ❖ GPS and compass
  - ❖ VS-17 panel
  - ❖ One case of MREs
  - ❖ One case of water
  - ❖ Nine-line procedures
  - ❖ First-Aid bag
  - ❖ Tow straps
  - ❖ Radios
  - ❖ Jumper cables
  - ❖ Fix-A-Flat
  - ❖ Duct tape
  - ❖ Fire extinguisher
  - ❖ Parachute (550) cord (500 feet)



## **Annex D: PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT CHECKLIST**

1. Uniforms and clothing:
  - Kevlar helmet
  - Body armor with ballistic plates
  - Knife
  - Gloves
  - Hearing protection
  - Ballistic eye protection
  - Cold / hot weather gear (as appropriate)
  
2. Weapons (primary and secondary, if authorized)
  - Clean
  - Functions check
  - Basic load of ammunition

## **Annex E: EMPLOYMENT OF M249 SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON (SAW) IN CONVOY OPERATIONS**

The M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) is intended to provide additional firepower for contractor convoys. Although not a crew served weapon, it does meet the MNC-I intent of providing sufficient security for the transport of USAESCH (IRAQ) material.

The M249 can be used inside of a vehicle, or from a protected position in the bed of a pickup truck. On normal administrative convoy operations, one SAW would be carried in the lead vehicle and a second SAW would be in the trail vehicle. If there are five or more vehicles in the convoy, then an additional SAW would be placed somewhere in the middle of the convoy. With any increase in the size of the convoys, there should also be a commensurate increase in the number of M249's employed. As an example, for every two to three vehicle increase, one more SAW should be added to one of the vehicles (not necessarily a security vehicle).

In high threat areas, or during heightened security, consideration should be given to equipping each vehicle in the convoy with a SAW. When escorting USAESCH (IRAQ) material, all security vehicles should carry at least one SAW due to the extremely high risk nature of the mission, as well as the convoy's slow movement.

Each SAW should be employed with at least three 200 round assault magazines. The weapon should be inspected prior to departure and test fired at least monthly in order to ensure serviceability. Documentation on service and test firing will be kept on site for reference and for security audits.

## **Annex F: ADMINISTRATIVE CONVOY PLAN**

**PURPOSE:** This plan establishes practices and procedures that shall be employed by all USAESCH (IRAQ) elements participating in the USAESCH (Iraq)s Clearance (USAESCH (IRAQ)) Program in Iraq. A Risk Management approach is described whose goal is to expose the minimum number of personnel to the minimum danger for the least amount of time.

### **DEFINITIONS:**

**Secure Area:** Areas that are under the complete control of coalition military forces or Iraqi security forces. Entry into these areas requires verification of identity, search of vehicles, and a valid purpose for being there. Iraqi employees and visitors are not allowed free movement and are under continuous observation by security forces.

**Unsecure Areas:** Any area that is accessible to the general Iraqi population is considered to be unsecured.

**Administrative Convoys:** All land movements of USAESCH (IRAQ) employees and non-Iraqi subcontractor personnel that involve transit of unsecured areas when the purpose of that movement is not directly related to work. Generally, all personnel movements other than those between USAESCH (IRAQ) Life Support Areas (LSA) and work sites and movements that do not involve the transport of USAESCH (IRAQ) are administrative. Examples include transporting personnel to airports for home leave and visiting AAFES or MWR facilities at other military bases.

**ENFORCEMENT:** Failure to adhere to these and other protective practices established by USAESCH (IRAQ), the Corps of Engineers, and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) not only endangers lives and property, but also causes otherwise avoidable exposure of personnel who may be called upon to rescue or recover those involved. Therefore, flagrant violation of these procedures shall be grounds for termination. Supervisory personnel are responsible for ensuring that all subordinates are aware of and comply with the provisions of this plan.

**MANDATORY PRACTICES:** Exceptions to the below list of practices will be made by the USAESCH (IRAQ) Site Manager on a case-by-case basis when movement involves emergency leave or medical necessity and compliance cannot be achieved. However, **in no case** will the three security vehicle with 4 armed escort per minimum requirement be waived. All USAESCH (IRAQ) convoys will be endorsed by the respective USAESCH (IRAQ) Site Manager, and approved by the CoE Contracting Officer.

1. Administrative Convoys will not be conducted for the benefit of one or two personnel. Instead, trips through unsecured areas shall be consolidated. Unit personnel shall be advised of scheduled convoy days sufficiently far in advance so that they can make appropriate air travel arrangements.

2. Administrative Convoys will not be conducted more than once a week.

3. No administrative convoy will depart without receiving an update from the nearest US Army unit, or FOB S2, on the current road status, as well as the current road conditions.

### **MOVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONVOYS:**

1. Composition. The minimum requirement is **THREE** (3) vehicles for movement with at least two (2) armed security personnel per security vehicle. Armored vehicles are to be used whenever possible. In a convoy with more than three vehicles, the vehicle order is dependent upon the number and type of vehicles. General convoy composition guidelines are:

- a. The Security Team Leader is the convoy commander.
- b. Security vehicles are the first two vehicles and the last vehicle in the convoy.
- c. Whenever possible a leapfrogging advance security element will lead out the convoy to clear and hold danger areas and choke points until the convoy passes through.
- d. If more than three security vehicles are available, then the other security vehicles are intermixed within the convoy and/or used as advance vehicles.
- e. In non-security vehicles security personnel will be seated shotgun or behind the driver. Security should provide the driver whenever possible with the exception of PLS.
- f. One (1) convoy Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) will ride in a security vehicle. If there is more than one EMT they will ride in separate vehicles.

2. Communications. Vehicles in the convoy have redundant communications with each other.

3. Basic Convoy Procedures. See basic SOP, General.

4. Convoy briefings. See basic SOP, Convoy Briefing.


**BASIC TACTICS AND PROCEDURES:** The tactics and procedures detailed below are general in nature and are provided as guidelines for all security operations. As threats, situations, locations, and mission parameters change on almost a daily basis in country, the USAESCH (IRAQ) Security Manager will be responsible for implementing additional tactics and changes to procedures as the situation dictates.

1. For tactical planning purposes, USAESCH (IRAQ) considers all vehicle transportation movements as tactical convoys and each movement will be treated as a high-threat convoy operation, regardless of distance, size or scope.

2. Vehicle spacing and speed is terrain, day/night, tactical situation, and environment dependent.

3. Fields of Fire. General fields of fire will encompass a 360-degree area of defense and coverage at all times. Specific fields of fire are determined by weapons, personnel, threat, and terrain.

4. **Rally points are to be used when exiting a kill zones to obtain accountability of all personnel, treat the wounded and repair damage on vehicles. There will be a 1000 meter floating rally points used by all convoys.**



## **Weapons Fields of Fire Convoy Example**

4. Evasive Maneuvers. Dependent upon the threat or attack, evasive maneuvers will generally fall under the tactic of avoidance, defend, and retreat. Here are the primary objectives of a tactical convoy during high-threat activities:

- a) Threat Detection and Avoidance. Evasive maneuvers to ensure no contact with known or suspected threats.
- b) Defend Against a Known Threat. If avoidance is no longer viable, then direct firepower assault in conjunction with evasive maneuvers is the 'first strike' policy.
- c) Retreat from the Threat. The primary purpose of tactical convoy operations is to avoid assaults and threats. If a threat or attack is detected, then a retreat (reversal or alternate route to rally point) is executed whenever possible. If in the kill zone then the only alternative is to fight through it.

## **FRONTAL ATTACK MANUEVER**

5. Side Ambush Maneuver. Many of the attacks in this region have originated from either the left or right side position and at the middle section of the convoy. The primary objective of the convoy is to move out of the kill zone as fast as possible, while maintaining convoy integrity.

- a.) Target identification of the enemy and engage.
- b.) Rapid forward movement thru kill zone.
- c.) Convoy integrity and head count
- d.) Alternate route back to base camp or to destination if past the "Point of No Return".
- e.) Report contact and call for fire or QRF if needed

**Annex G**  
**MND SE Rules of Engagement**

## RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

### 1. Introduction.

This annex contains the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force in the DA BG. UK units operate subject to national ROE and will inform CO DA BG of any national restrictions or caveats which might have an impact on interoperability.

Legal advice on other operational law issues can be found in DA BG SOP, including:

- Guidance to permanent medical personnel.
- Code of Conduct
- DA BG Weapons confiscation policy
- Handling of Detainees.
- Guidance and documentation applicable to search operations.
- Aspects of The Iraqi police, court system and prison system case tracking.
- Handling of claims against the DA BG.
- Guidance on the use of force in certain framework operations.
- Issues related to the legal status of DA BG personnel in Iraq and Kuwait.

#### 1.1. Basis.

The ROE in force are based upon ROE issued by UK Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ UK) and agreed upon with the Kingdom of Denmark taking into consideration national caveats. Reference to MND(SE) SOI 911, which promulgates MND SE framework ROE. Further Danish instructions can be found in Defence Command Denmark ODO2 UF 102.0/0402413 dated 01 September 2004.

#### 1.2. Geographical area.

For DANBG the ROE in force are restricted to the territory, airspace and territorial seas of Iraq.

Kuwait: If MNF are fired upon from Kuwaiti territory, the fire may be answered to the extent necessary to suppress the hostile act and if deemed appropriate in the situation, hot pursuit may be conducted into Kuwaiti territory. The TOC must be informed and - if the situation allows – consulted.

Iran: DA BG soldiers are not under any circumstances to set foot on Iranian soil. However if shots are fired from within Iranian territory, the fire can be answered to the extent necessary to stop the hostile act.

### 2. General

The ROE profile in force for DANBG reflects the ROE issued by UK authority and promulgated by MND(SE). It takes into account Command and Control arrangements agreed between participating nations as in Ref. C and national directives as issued in Ref. E. National clarifications to the MND(SE) ROE profile are made on the basis that such clarification will not be more permissive than the TELIC 003 ROE profile and will be communicated to MND(SE) force commander.

The use of force executed within this ROE profile will be correlated to the framework provided by UNSCR 1546, MNF assessment of current security environment in Iraq, GOC



MND(SE) intentions, BDE directives, CO DANBG intent and concept of operation as stated in this plan.

Enclosure 1 contains the ROE in force for DA BG, including applicable national caveats, interpretation, detailed instructions and remarks.

### **3. General principles on the use of force**

3.1 The use of lethal force is permitted only to prevent loss of life or to protect materiel, the loss or destruction of which could be potentially life threatening for Coalition Forces. See para 4.2 below.

3.2 Force should be used as a last resort only. Whenever feasible other means of escalation control should be applied. E.g. verbal warnings and/or show of force.

3.3 The degree of force used must be no more than is reasonably necessary to control the situation. In all cases the utmost care must be taken to avoid harm to civilians or damage to civilian property.

### **4. DA BG ROE Definitions**

The following definitions apply to the ROE Matrix in enclosure 1.

#### 4.1. Specially Designated persons.

Use of minimum force up to and if necessary and proportional, deadly force is authorised in order to defend, prevent interference with, capture, illegal detention or kidnapping of the following protected persons:

- All DANBG, MND(SE) and MNF-I forces personnel
- Iraqi and 3<sup>rd</sup> country civilians,
- POW and Detained/Interned persons
- NGOs and IO's who are assisting with the Humanitarian Aid effort.
- Iraqi security forces.

#### 4.2. Specially Designated property.

Use of minimum force up to and if necessary and proportional, deadly force is authorised in order to prevent the seizure, capture, boarding, detention and destruction of the following pre-designated property:

- Weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and crypto equipment, ECM or Coalition Force Tracker belonging to MNF, and
- to avert an assessed imminent threat to life such as assaults against:
  - Structures essential for the maintenance of public order, health and hygiene
  - Electricity generation and distribution facilities
  - Sample transport containers used in WMD sampling operations
  - Oil infrastructure.

The following property is pre-designated as requiring protection by the use of minimum force up to but not including deadly force (as the threat to human life is less immediate and a second or third order consequence of the loss or damage)

- Port facilities
- Food warehouses
- Communication facilities
- Banks

- Ammunition storage sites

#### 4.3. Hostile Intent.

An action or actions (pattern of behaviour) indicating intent to commit a hostile act. The existence of hostile intent may be judged by either:

- The threatening element, unit or force's capability and preparedness to inflict damage.
- Evidence, particularly intelligence, which indicates that a surprise strike has been, or is about to be, launched.

Examples of events which might be evidence of hostile intent are:

- Elements, or units, moving into weapons launch positions, whether MNF forces are presently in range or not, and preparing to fire, launch or release weapons.
- Repeated and extensive harassment of MNF forces or elements under MNF protection.
- The existence of increased indicators of mobilisation/ preparedness or warlike actions, movements of weapons and ammunition or intelligence with regard to intentions.

#### 4.4. Hostile act.

A hostile act is an aggressive act against MNF forces or person/property designated by DA BG, MND(SE) Force Commander, where death or serious bodily harm would likely result.

Examples of such actions are:

- Elements breaching or attempting to breach MNF military installations or restricted areas.
- Vehicles driven high speed, directly into check points military installations regardless of warning to slow down.

#### 4.5. Military Restricted Area.

A secure area in a designated location, used by MNF, in which the movement of non- MNF personnel is restricted. For this operation DA BG and MND(SE) Force Commander or Component Commanders or designated subordinate commanders may declare military restricted areas and designated persons allowed access, and take such steps to establish such areas and clear them of all unauthorised persons. This includes the authority to remove military or para-military forces or people as required.

Examples include arms and ordnance storage sites, personnel processing areas, command and control areas, check points and billeting areas.

#### 4.6. Element.

An individual, vehicle, vessel or aircraft platform.

#### 4.7. Unit.

Any military element whose structure is prescribed by a competent authority.

#### 4.8. Riot Control Means.

Any means, short of deadly force, used for force protection or to deter or prevent elements from interfering with mission accomplishment.

Examples include (but are not limited to)

- Use of incapacitating agents (Riot Control Agents).
- Rubber bullets/baton rounds.
- Water cannon.
- Batons.
- Riot control clothing,

4.9. Less Than Lethal Weapons.

See Enclosure 4.

5. Changes to the Roe Release Authority Matrix.

Changes or adjustments of authorised ROE can be requested in a ROE request (ROEREQ) addressed for CO DA BG. Any format can be used.

6. Duty to act:

If possible without endangering own forces unnecessarily, DANBG personnel are expected to intervene in defence of any person who is made subject of a serious, violent crime which can be expected to lead to loss of life or serious damage to person.

If DA BG witness IZ law enforcement agencies abuse their power to punish or abuse persons in their custody it may be considered inappropriate to intervene physically in the situation. In such situations contact shall be taken to the IZ officer in charge and the mistreatment should be immediately stopped. If the mistreatment continues C/S should abort the mission and return to SLB to report.

In any event report shall be given to DA BG TOC immediately after such violent behaviour is witnessed. DA BG TOC will provide further instructions on a case by case basis.